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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 1996, campaign rhetoric became reality when "Gov. [Mike]
Foster signed into law his first bills, three measures that will drastically change
the nature of civil litigation in Louisiana."' These bills were a part of the
governor's pro-business tort reform package.' One such bill, House Bill 21,
amended and reenacted Civil Code article 2323 and greatly simplified the law
of comparative fault.
Art. 2323. Comparative fault
A. In any action for damages where a person suffers injury, death,
or loss, the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or
contributing to the injury, death, or loss shall be determined, regardless
of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and
regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by
statute, including but not limited to the provisions of R.S. 23:1032, or
that the person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable. If
a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or
persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in
proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the
person suffering the injury, death, or loss.
B. The provisions of Paragraph A shall apply to any claim for
recovery of damages for injury, death, or loss asserted under any law
or legal doctrine or theory of liability, regardless of the basis of
liability.
C. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraphs A and B, if a
person suffers injury, death, or loss as a result partly of his own
negligence and partly as a result of the fault of an intentional tortfeasor,
his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced.'
Simply stated, in a tort action the factfinder must determine the fault of all
parties, including the plaintiff and everyone "causing or contributing to the injury
... regardless of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and
regardless of the person's insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute... or
that the person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable." Once the
Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Christopher Cooper, Tort Reform Signed Into Law, The New Orleans Times.Picayune, April
17, 1996, at Al.
2. Id.
3. 1996 La. Acts No. 3.
4. Id.
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percentages of fault are determined, each actor is liable to the plaintiff for their
respective percentage of fault. Obviously, if each actor is liable for his
percentage of fault, the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced by his own
percentage of fault. Consequently, "a person or business only partially at fault
in an accident cannot be made to pay more than their [sic] share of the damages
as determined by the courts."' Finally, if a plaintiff's negligence combines with
an actor's intentional tort, the plaintiff's percentage of fault shall be determined,
however "his claim for recovery of damages shall not be reduced."'
The tort reform package did not stop at comparative fault, it also addressed
the concept of solidary liability. House Bill 21 amended and reenacted Civil
Code article 2324.
Art. 2324. Liability as solidary or joint and divisible obligation
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, then liability
for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and
divisible obligation. A joint tortfeasor shall not be liable for more than
his degree of fault and shall not be solidarily liable with any other
person for damages attributable to the fault of such other person,
including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such
other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, immunity by
statute or otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided
in R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person's identity is not known or
reasonably ascertainable.7
The reference to "Paragraph A," is a reference to paragraph A of Civil Code article
2324. Paragraph A states: "He who conspires with another person to commit an
intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage
caused by such act." Therefore, under revised Civil Code article 2324, only
intentional or willful tortfeasors who act to cause harm will be solidarily liable for
the damages they cause. Also, "[i]f liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph
A, then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint and
divisible obligation."8 Finally, under revised Civil Code article 2324, "[a] joint
tortfeasor shall not be liable for more than his degree of fault... regardless of such
other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, immunity by statute or
otherwise, including but not limited to immunity as provided in R.S. 23:1032, or
that the other person's identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable."' Simply
stated, under revised Civil Code article 2324, a negligent tortfeasor will only be
liable for his percentage of fault. For example, if a tortfeasor's percentage of fault
is determined to be 10%, he will be liable for only 10%.
S. Cooper, supra note I.
6. 1996 La. Acts No. 3.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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A fact specific, fictional example may shed some light on how these revised
articles will work together. Fred was injured in the course and scope of his
employment for Slade Gravel Co. on April 30, 1996. Fred's injuries were
caused by the concurrent negligence of Slade Gravel Co. and three third parties,
Wilma, Betty, and Barney, an unknown nomad. After the accident, Barney,
reflecting his nomadic tendencies, left town and his whereabouts are unknown.
When Fred's case went to trial, the jury was required, under revised article 2323,
to quantify the fault of all of the parties, including Fred's immune employer
Slade Gravel Co." and the unknown/absent defendant, Barney. The jury then
assessed fault as follows:
Fred 10%
Slade Gravel Co. 10%
Wilma 15%
Betty 10%
Barney 55%
Under revised Article 2324, Fred was then able to collect only 25% of his
judgment, 15% from.Wilma and 10% from Betty. Obviously, Fred could not
collect from Barney, who was absent, nor could he collect from Slade Gravel
Co., his immune employer. Contrary to prior jurisprudence, revised Civil Code
article 2324 does not provide for the "bumping" of any defendant's liability to
50%, nor does it provide for a pro-rata division of an absent tortfeasor's
percentage of fault. In other words, neither Wilma nor Betty can have their
relative degree of fault elevated to 50% to ensure Fred's recovery of 50% of his
judgment. Furthermore, the absent defendant's percentage of fault will not be
divided on a pro-rata basis among the remaining parties. Under House Bill 21,
each party's fault is calculated and each party is responsible for their assigned
percentage of fault, period.
This casenote reflects the state of Louisiana law and the questions presented
by the jurisprudence prior to House Bill 21. House Bill 21 represents the latest
chapter in the struggle with the law of comparative fault and solidary liability.
However, prior to the special session, the Louisiana Supreme Court had the
proverbial last word and, given the sometimes antagonistic roles of the court and
legislature, the policies espoused by the court remain relevant." In Cavalier
v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc.,' " the Louisiana Supreme Court, for the third
time in the last five years,'3 addressed the issue of whether a factfinder should
quantify an employer's fault when the concurrent negligence of the employer and
10. The Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme provides an employer with an immunity
from suit in a negligence action. See La. P.-S. 23:1032 (1995).
11. See Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Ongoing "Turf War"for Louisiana
Tort Law: Interpreting Immunity and the Solidarity Skirmish, 56 La. L. Rev. 215 (1995).
12. 657 So. 2d 975 (La. 1995).
13. Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993); Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co., 579 So.
2d 947 (La. 1991).
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a third party combined to cause harm to an employee. Held: "[Q]uantification
of [an employer's] fault is unnecessary and inappropriate."" However, if the
Cavalier decision was made according to revised Civil Code article 2323, the
result would be completely different. Revised Civil Code article 2323
specifically addresses the situation presented in Cavalier. Under revised Civil
Code article 2323, quantification of an employer's fault is mandated.
This casenote will address Cavalier's impact on the quantification of fault
in negligence actions. In Part II, this casenote will detail the facts and issues
presented to the supreme court in Cavalier. In Part III, this casenote will review
the supreme court's prior handling of the issue. In Part IV, this casenote will
describe how the Cavalier court resolved these issues and the court's reasoning.
Finally, in Part V, this casenote will suggest what policies the Cavalier decision
espouses, examine the notions of imputed negligence and duty/risk, describe how
Cavalier may have affected solidary liability prior to the 1996 special session,
and review some of the practical consequences of the decision.
II. CA iaER v. CAIN's HYDROSTATIC TESTING, INC.
Dennis Cavalier worked as a manual laborer for WHC Contractors ("WHC")
which had contracted with Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. ("Transcontinen-
tal') to fabricate and install a pipeline. WHC, in turn, subcontracted the
hydrostatic testing of the pipeline to Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc. ("Cain's").
While assisting Ray Parrish, an employee of Cain's, with the hydrostatic testing
of the pipeline, Cavalier removed a plug from a valve connected to a section of
pipe that was being depressurized. This in turn was the cause of Cavalier's
injuries."
Cavalier filed a personal injury suit in the Thirty-Second Judicial District
Court, Parish of Terrebonne, against Transcontinental, Parrish, and Cain's. 6
WHC's worker's compensation carrier intervened to recover worker's compensa-
tion benefits paid to Cavalier. ," Transcontinental settled with Cavalier before trial
and was dismissed from the suit. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider the
fault of all blameworthy persons regardless of whether they were, or had ever been,
a party to the suit. Fixing the damage award at $500,000.00, the jury found Cain's
20% negligent, WHC 80% negligent, and allocated no fault to Transcontinental or
Parrish. The trial court, however, found that WHC was immune from suit because
it was Cavalier's employer'" and disregarded WHC's 80% share of the damage
award. The trial court held Cain's liable only for its virile share, 20% of the total
14. Camvlier, 657 So. 2d at 978.
15. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc. 637 So. 2d 724, 726 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
16. Id.
17. The Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme allows an employer to intervene in a suit
to recover compensation that has already been paid to the employee. See La. R.S. 23:1101 (1995).
18. The Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme provides an employer with an immunity
from suit in a negligence action. See La. R.S. 23:1032 (1995).
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damage award, or $100,000.00 of the awarded $500,000.00. Additionally, the court
awarded WHC's worker's compensation carrier 20% of the compensation
payments made to Cavalier. All parties appealed. 9
In an opinion by Chief Judge Lottinger, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal amended the trial court's judgment and held that under Gauthier v.
O'Brien," Cain's was liable for the full amount of the damage award,
$500,000.00.1 ' The court explained that Gauthier required the factfinder to
quantify the immune employer's percentage of fault and then reallocate that fault
among the remaining at-fault parties.' As Cain's was the only remaining at-fault
party, it bore the reallocation of the immune party's fault alone.' Therefore, the
court found Cain's liable for 100% of the damage award.2' The court of appeal
also amended the trial court's award to WHC's compensation carrier and awarded
the carrier 100% of the compensation payments made to Cavalier.2
On writ of certiorari, the Louisiana Supreme Court "decided to revisit the
question of whether the jury, or judge in a bench trial, should quantify the fault
19. Cavalier, 637 So. 2d at 726.
20. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993).
21. Cavalier, 637 So. 2d at 724.
22. This reallocation formula will be referred to as the "Gauthier Formula." For example:
Fred is injured during the course and scope of his employment for Slade Gravel Co. Fred's injuries
are caused by the concurrent negligence of Slade Gravel Co. and two parties not affiliated with Slade,
Barney, and Wilma. Fred's own contributory negligence was also a cause of the accident. The jury
allocates fault as follows:
Fred 10%
Slade Gravel Co. 40%
Barney 20%
Wilma 30%
Because of worker's compensation, Slade Gravel Co. is immune from suit. Slade's fault will be
apportioned among all of the remaining at-fault parties on a pro rats basis. To determine how much
each party will have to bear, add the percentages of fault of all of the parties except the immune
party, Slade. Fred + Barney + Wilma; or 10 + 20 + 30 = 60. Each party will bear a pro rata share
of the employer's fault. In other words, Fred will bear 10/60 or 1/6 (his total/remaining parties total)
of the 400/a. Fred's grand total is 10%/o + 6.6% (approximately his percentage of Slade's fault; 1/6(40)
= 6.6) = 16.6%. Barney will bear 20/60 or 1/3 of the 40%. Barney's grand total is 2016 + 13.3%
(approximately his percentage of Slade's fault; 1/3(40) = 13.3) = 33.3%. Wilma will bear 30/60 or
1/2 (her total/remaining parties' total) of the 40%. Wilma's grand total is 3006 + 200 (approximately
her percentage of Slade's fault; 1/2(40) = 20) = 50%. This method accounts for 100% of the
applicable fault including the fault of immune parties. Using the approximate numbers for example:
16.6% + 33.3% + 5001a = 99.9%.
23. Cavalier, 637 So. 2d at 730. The trial court did instruct the factfinder to quantify the
employer's fault but failed to reallocate the employer's fault among the at-fault parties. Because
Cain's was the only remaining at-fault party, the final outcome was unaffected.
24. Id. at 729-30.
25. Id. at 730.
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of the plaintiff's employer in a tort action against a third party tortfeasor. ' 'th
Expressly overruling Gauthier," a unanimous court held the quantification of
an employer's fault was "unnecessary and inappropriate."2 Quantification of
an employer's degree of fault is neither "suggested by La.Code Civ.Proc. art.
1812C [n]or is made mandatory by La.Civ.Code art. 2324B."" The court
overruled the appellate court's reasoning, which was based on Gauthier, but
affirmed the result, holding Cain's liable for 100% of the damages because it
was the only party whose fault the jury should have quantified.30 Finally, in
dicta, the court noted the appropriateness of quantifying the fault of non-parties
in the following situations: a settling tortfeasor,3" a party whose negligence is
26. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 979 (La. 1995).
27. Id. at 984.
28. Id. at 978.
29. Id. at 984. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812(C) reads:
(C) In cases to recover damages for injury, death, or loss, the court may submit to the
jury special written questions inquiring as to:
(1) Whether a party from whom damages are claimed, or the person for whom such
party is legally responsible, was at fault, and, if so:
(a) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and, if so:
(b) The degree of fault, expressed in percentage.
(2) If appropriate, whether another person, whether party or not, other than the person
suffering injury, death, or loss, was at fault, and, if so:
(a) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and, if so:
(b) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage.
(3) If appropriate, whether there was negligence attributable to any party claiming
damages, and, if so:
(a) Whether such negligence was a legal cause-of the damages, and, if so:
(b) The degree of such negligence, expressed in percentage.
(4) The total amount of damages sustained as a result of the injury, death, or loss,
expressed in dollars.
La. Civ. Code art. 2324 (1988) reads:
A. He who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is
answerable, in soido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act.
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, or as otherwise provided by law,
then liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be solidary only to the
extent necessary for the person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of
his recoverable damages; however, when the amount of recovery has been reduced in
accordance with the preceding Article, a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more than
the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of fault has been
attributed. Under the provisions of this Article, all parties shall enjoy their respective
rights of indemnity and contribution. Except as described in Paragraph A of this Article,
or as otherwise provided by law, and hereinabove, the liability for damages caused by two
or more persons shall be a joint, divisible obligation, and a joint tortfeasor shall not be
solidary liable with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other
person, including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless of such other
person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, or immunity by statute or otherwise.
30. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 984.
31. Id. at 981.
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imputed to the plaintiff or defendant,32 and the court implied that it was also
appropriate to quantify a third-party defendant's fault.33
IIl. THE SUPREME COURT'S PRIOR HOLDINGS ON QUANTIFICATION OF
EMPLOYER FAULT
A. Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co.
The Louisiana Supreme Court first faced the issue of whether to quantify an
employer's fault in a third party workplace tort suit in the 1991 case of Guidry
v. Frank Guidry Oil Co. 4 In dissent, Justice Lemmon clearly stated "the issue
... [to be decided is] how to handle employer fault in comparative fault cases
involving multiple tortfeasors.'"3 In a 4-3 decision, the court held the factfinder
should not quantify the employer's fault.3' The court's analysis focused on the
worker's compensation scheme, the way other jurisdictions have handled the
same issues, and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C).
The court began by noting "[t]he rights and remedies of an employee in the
Louisiana compensation scheme exclude all other rights and remedies against the
employer." 7  Under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme, the
employee surrenders his tort rights for the right to receive compensation, while
the employer pays the compensation premiums with the certain knowledge that
by doing so, he will be immune from suit in a negligence action. 8 When the
court turned to other states for guidance as to whether to quantify the immune
employer's fault, it found the other jurisdictions evenly divided on the issue.39
Finally, the court looked to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
In its examination of Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C), the Guidry
court found Lemire v. New Orleans Public Service. Inc.40 instructive. In
Lemire, the court had held quantification of an immune party's fault was
mandatory. 4' The Guidry court, however, distinguished Lemire because Lemire
32. Id at 981 n.3.
33. Id. at 982.
34. 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991). Justice Watson wrote for the majority. Justice Lemmon
dissented and assigned reasons. Justice Calegero dissented and Justice Hall dissented, in part, and
also assigned reasons. Justice Lemmon's dissent is noteworthy because he wrote for a unanimous
court in Cavalier. Cavalier and Guidry are consistent in their holdings.
35. Id. at 954.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 952.
38. Id. at 953. Under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme the employer is immune
from suit in a negligence action. He is not immune from suit for an intentional tort.
39. Id. (citing 2 Arthur Larson & Lex Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, § 76.11, at 14-
561 (1982)).
40. 458 So. 2d 1308 (La. 1984).
41. Id. at 1311.
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involved the statutory immunity of public agencies, whereas Guidry concerned
the statutory immunity of employers. The court reasoned:
[T]he compensation principle excludes the concept of employer fault.
It is not clear that the statutory language was intended to embrace
employer fault. Since the statute does not specifically require juries to
consider the comparative fault of employers, there is no express
legislative directive on the issue. Extending the amendment to
employers would violate the compensation principle and cannot be done
by implication,'
Therefore, the court held that Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C) does not
require the quantification of an employer's degree of fault.
B. Gauthier v. O'Brien
Two years after the Guidry decision, the court, in Gauthier v. O'Brien,3
overruled Guidry and determined that the then recently amended Civil Code article
2324(B) required the quantification of an immune employer's fault.' However,
the court instructed that after the factfinder determined the employer's fault, the
judge was to redistribute it proportionately among the other at-fault parties. The
Gauthier court considered the same factors as the Guidry court in its analysis.
The court dispensed with Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C) and Lemire
quickly, explaining "[iln our view, the statutorily immune employer is analogous
to the political subdivision defendant in Lemire."' Moreover the court also stated
"[a]llocating fault with respect to the employer pursuant to La.Code Civ. Proc. ait.
1812(C)(2) will likewise serve to implement Louisiana's comparative fault
scheme."' The court found the doctrine of comparative fault required the
factfinder to determine the fault of all parties, including immune parties.
The court acknowledged that the great deal of jurisprudence preceding
Gauthier had held the factfinder should not quantify an employer's fault."
However, the court held in Gauthier that the jury should quantify an employer's
42. Guidry, 579 So. 2d at 953-54.
43. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993).
44. Louisiana Civil Code article 2324 was also amended prior to the Gauthier decision;
however, as footnote one in Guidry's dissent notes, 579 So. 2d 947, 954 (La. 1991). Guidry arose
prior to the enactment of Article 2324(B). Article 2324(B) did apply in Gauthier.
45. Gauthler, 618 So. 2d at 829.
46. Id.
47. E.g., Davis v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying
Louisiana law); Reed v. Shell Offshore, 872 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Louisiana law);
Melton v. General Elec. Co., 579 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991); Weber v. Caterpiller Machinery Corp., 542
So. 2d 544 (La App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 548 So. 2d 332 (1989); Thompson v. PetroUnited
Terminals, Inc., 536 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 212 (1989); Eskine
v. Regional Transit Authority, 531 So. 2d 1159 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); and Senez v. Gmmam
Flxible Corp., 518 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1151 (1988).
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fault.' The court rejected the contention that having the factfinder quantify an
employer's fault constituted an "inroad into the workers' compensation
scheme,"49 stating:
[Tihis characterization seems to overlook the fact that the employee has
already recovered or will recover compensation as well as medical
benefits from his or her employer. While it has been suggested that plain-
tiff/employees may be harmed by the reduction of their recovery based
upon the combined proportion of fault allocated to the employer and the
employee; the employee's rights under the Louisiana workers' compensa-
tion scheme are neither curtailed nor denied by allocating employer fault
in tort actions against third parties."
The court noted that other states with compensation schemes similar to Louisiana's
had quantified employer fault without "an adverse impact on the employer or the
employee."' The court cited the Supreme Court of Idaho with approval: "'[t]rue
apportionment [of fault] cannot be achieved unless that apportionment includes all
tortfeasors guilty of causal negligence either causing or contributing to the
occurrence in question, whether or not they are parties to the case.' 5 2
The court found further support for the quantification of an employer's fault
in the last sentence of Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B):
Except as described in Paragraph A of this Article, or otherwise provided
by law, and hereinabove, the liability for damages caused by two or more
persons shall be ajoint, divisible obligation, and ajoint tortfeasor shall not
be solidarily liable with any other person for damages attributable to the
fault of such other person, including the person suffering injury, death, or
loss, regardless of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree
of fault, or immunity by statute or otherwise.S3
In the end, the court was unable to find any "compelling reason to refuse to
assess employer fault under the circumstances presented by this case. 54 The
court held "[w]e overrule Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co .... the assessment of
fault is made mandatory by the 1987 amendment to La. Civ. Code art. 2324 B, and
to that extent Guldry... [is] no longer the law.""
48. - Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 831.
49. Id. at 829.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 830 (quoting Pocatello Ind. Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 787, 621
P.2d 399, 403 (Idaho 1980)).
53. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B) (1988).
54. Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 830.
55. Id. at 83 1. The court also overruled Guidry's companion case, Melton v. General Elec. Co.,
579 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991). In Mellon, the court held, as in Guidry, an employer's fault should not
be quantified in a workplace negligence suit. Id.
19961
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IV. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES BY THE CAVALIER COURT
The Cavalier decision departed from Gauthier and returned to the older
jurisprudence concerning the quantification of employer fault. In 1993, two
years before Cavalier, the supreme court held in Gauthier v. O'Brien that the
jury must quantify an employer's fault. Gauthier was the basis for the first
circuit's decision in Cavalier. The first circuit held the factfinder must quantify
an immune employer's fault and the judge must proportionally allocate the
employer's fault among the remaining at-fault parties, including the plaintiff.'
On appeal, the supreme court stated: "We therefore overrule the holding of
Gauthier that quantification of employer fault either is suggested by La. Code
Civ. Proc. art. 1812C or is made mandatory by La. Civ. Code art. 2324B." 7
In dicta, the court also addressed the issues of quantification of other non-party
fault and solidary liability.
A. Quantification and Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C)
The supreme court in Cavalier centered its analysis of the quantification
issue around Code of Civil Procedure article 1812, the history of Louisiana's
adoption of the comparative fault system, and Civil Code article 2324. Code of
Civil Procedure article 1812 was amended in 1979 as a part of a legislative
initiative to implement a system of comparative fault in Louisiana."i The court
explained "[a]rticle 1812C(2) permits quantification of the tault of 'another
person, whether party or not,' if such quantifcation is appropriate. "59 Thus,
article 181.2 does not mandate that the factfinder quantify an employer's or a
non-party's fault.' Rather, the quantification of a non-party's fault is "inher-
ently a question to be decided by the courts. MI In performing its discretionary
function, the court analyzed those factors favoring and disfavoring quantification.
The court noted that under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation scheme, when
an employee is injured by the negligence of the employer or by the combined
negligence of an employer and a third party, the employer is immune from suit
by the employee, is immune from suit by third parties seeking contribution, and
has a statutory lien on the employee's recovery from third persons.62 The court
explained that quantifying the fault of the employer would only hurt the
employee. First, it would reduce the total amount of recoverable fault by
including the immune employer in the allocation of fault. Second, the employer
56. The "Gauthier Formula," see supra note 22. As the first circuit noted, Cain's was the only
remaining at-fault party and would therefore bear the burden of the immune employer alone.
57. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 984 (La. 1995).
58. 1979 La. Acts No. 431.
59. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 980 (emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 981.
62. See supra notes 17, 18. and 38.
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could recover any compensation payments made to the employee from the
amount the employee recovers from the third party.63 Because the court
preferred to protect the employee's ights before the third party's, it determined
that the factfinder should not quantify an employer's percentage of fault under
Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C).
B. Quantification and Civil Code Article 2324(B)
In examining Article 2324, the court began with a historical overview of
fault quantification and Louisiana's adoption of the doctrine of comparative fault.
Before 1980, a joint tortfeasor could be held liable for 100% of the judgment,
but he enjoyed contribution rights against the other tortfeasors." In 1979, the
Louisiana Legislature amended five statutory provisions to adopt a system of
"pure" comparative fault.' However, the legislature failed to indicate whose
fault the factfinder should quantify.'e The legislature's attempt to implement
a more equitable comparative fault system was further flawed because Civil Code
article 2324 provided that joint tortfeasors, whether intentional or negligent, were
solidarily liable for the full amount of the damages. Consequently, if the
63; Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 982. For example: Fred is injured by the concurrent fault of his
employer, Slade Gravel Co., and a third party, Barney. The jury quantifies fault as follows:
Fred 10%
Slade Gravel Co. 60%10
Barney 30%.
Fred can only collect 30% of the award because Slade Gravel Co. is immune from suit under
worker's compensation. Fred's recovery of 30% is reduced further because Slade Gravel Co. is
allowed to make a claim for the return of compensation payments already made to Fred. This return
of compensation will come from the 30% Fred will receive.
64. The contribution claim was based on the number of tortfeasors. If there were three
tortfeasors each would be liable for one-third. If there were four, each would be liable for one.fourth
and so on. Contributory negligence was a bar to recovery. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Article
2324: The Discombobulating State of Solidarity in Post Tort Reform Louisiana, 54 La. L. Rev. 551,
552-53 (1994).
65. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 979. Comparative fault was adopted by 1979 La. Acts No. 431.
In a system of pure comparative fault the contributory negligence of the plaintiff reduces, but does
not bar, his recovery. In a modified comparative fault state, the plaintiff's recovery is barred if he
is fifty percent or more at fault. For example: Fred, Wilma, and Barney, all driving separate
vehicles, are involved in an automobile accident. Fred files suit. A jury determines Fred's fault to
be 51%, Wilma's 26%, and Barney's 23%. Fred's damage award is $100,000.00. In a state with
a pure comparative fault system, Fred could only recover $49,000.00, i.e., the total damages award
reduced by his percentage of fault, 51%. However, in a modified comparative fault state, Fred's
recovery would be barred because he is more than 500/ at fault. See Martha Chamallas, Comparative
Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 La. L. Rev. 373
(1980).
66. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act was not adopted by the legislature. The Uniform Act
calls for the factfinder to quantify the fault of settling tortfeasors and parties to the suit. See Uniform
Comparative Fault Act §2(a).
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factfinder determined a non-conspiring tortfeasor's fault, for example, to be 10%,
the plaintiff could hold that tortfeasor liable for the total amount of damages
despite his slight degree fault. That tortfeasor could, of course, seek contribution
from the other tortfeasor, but he would also bear the burden of a joint tortfeas-
or's insolvency.
In 1987, as a part of a "tort reform" initiative, the legislature amended Civil
Code article 2324 in an attempt to limit solidarity. 7 As enacted,"8 Civil Code
article 2324(B) reduced a non-conspiring joint tortfeasor's solidary obligation
from 100% to 50% of the recoverable damages.69 Article 2324(B) also stated
that a person would not become solidarily liable because of another's immunity.
The court noted, however, that this language did not suggest whether quantifica-
tion of an employer's fault was necessary. The court concluded that since:
neither Code of Civil Procedure article 1812 nor Civil Code article 2324(B)
required the factfinder to quantify an employer's fault, it was neither necessary
nor appropriate."
C. Quantifying the Fault of Other Parties
Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C) states a judge "may" instruct the
jury to quantify the fault of non-parties. However, the Cavalier court stated
unequivocally that "quantification of the fault of an employer is not necessary
or appropriate under Article 1812(C) in an action against a third party tort-
feasor."' Thus, use of Article 1812(C) to quantify an employer's fault whose
negligence combines with the negligence of a third party has been curtailed.
67. Galligan, supra note 64, at 551.
68. 1987 La. Acts No. 373, § 1.
69. Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B) (1987) provided in part:
(a) If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A (He who conspires with another
person to commit an intentional or willful act], or as otherwise provided by law, then
liability for the damages caused by two or more persons shall be solidary to the extent
necessaty for the person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages; (b) however, when the amount of recovery has been reduced in
accordance with the preceding Article (Civil Code article 2323 reduces the plaintiffs
recover), by the amount of his fault], a judgment debtor shall not be liable for more than
the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of fault has been
attributed.
(Emphasis and internal lower case "a" and "b" added). The meaning of section (a) was addressed
by the court in Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993). Stated simply section (b) provides
that if the plaintiffs degree of fault is greater than a joint, negligent tortfeasor, than that joint
negligent tortfeasor will be held liable only for his percentage of fault and no more.
70. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc,, 657 So. 2d 975, 978 (La. 1995). See Stockstill
v. C.F. Indus., Inc., 665 So. 2d 802 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d 428 (1996).
Stocbstll cites Cavalier as authority for not quantifying an employer's fault in a third-party,
workplace tort suit.
71. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 982.
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While the court placed an obvious limitation on the application of Code of
Civil Procedure article 1812(C) in the employer/employee context, the court
illustrated through express directive, implication, and footnote when the
factfinder should quantify fault. First, the court explicitly stated that a factfmder
should determine the fault of a non-party "when one tortfeasor has settled with
and obtained a release from the tort victim."72 Quantifying the fault of a
settling tortfeasor "is not only appropriate but is necessary" 73 because "the tort
victim's release of one tortfeasor deprives the remaining tortfeasors of their
contribution rights against the settling tortfeasor.' The tort victim's recovery,
therefore, "must be reduced by the proportionate share of the settling tortfeas-
or. 11 Without explanation, the court then implied that the factf'mder should
also quantify the fault of third-party defendants. "[J]uries should not be required
to quantify the fault of a person that no party sees fit to join in the suit as a
defendant or a third party defendant unless there is a compelling reason, such
as the case of a settling tortfeasor. 76 Presumably, the plaintiff would not have
to join the third party defendant as a primary defendant to have the third party's
fault quantified. The court's language implies that if any party adds a third party
to the suit, then the third party's fault should be quantified. Simply stated, a
person's fault should be considered if he is either a primary defendant or a third-
party defendant. To use Cavalier's language, quantifying a third-party
defendant's fault is appropriate and necessary. Finally, and again without
explanation, in footnote three of the opinion, the court stated that the factfinder
should quantify a non-party's fault if the non-party's fault is imputable to the
plaintiff or defendant."
D. Footnote Six, Civil Code Article 2324(B), and Touchard Footnote Three
On September 17, 1987, Brenda Williams, James Minter, Martha Causey,
and Steven Lege were involved in a four car accident on Interstate 10. Mary
Touchard, Brenda Williams' passenger, was injured in the accident and filed suit
against the four drivers. The jury awarded Touchard $100,000.00 and
apportioned fault among three of the four drivers as follows: Williams 63%;
Causey 30%; and Lege 7%.' Touchard received a total of $62,000.00 from the
parties. She received the policy limit of $25,000.00, from State Farm, Williams'
insurer; $30,000.00 from Allstate, Causey's insurer; and $7,000.00 from Texas
Farmer's, Lege's insurer.' Touchard did not receive the full amount of the
72. Id. at 981.
.73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 982 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 981 n.3.
78. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885, 886 (La. 1993).
79. Id. at 887.
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damage award because Williams was insolvent and her insurer had paid up to the
limit of her policy. The trial court's interpretation of Article 2324(B)'s limitation
of solidarity among tortfeasors would dictate from whom and how much
Touchard would receive. Based on Article 2324(B), "[t]he lower courts ...
created conditional or 'functional' solidary liability among joint tortfeasors.""
As a result, "the existence or non-existence of solidary liability among joint
tortfeasors is conditioned upon whether the victim can successfully recover fifty
percent of his recoverable damages from the joint tortfeasors."'" Therefore,
because Touchard's actual recovery exceeded 50% of her recoverable damages,
she was precluded from recovering additional amounts from either Causey or
Lege. ' The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed. 3
In 1993, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs "to determine whether
Louisiana Civil Code article 2324(B) imposes solidary liability on joint
tortfeasors only when the victim cannot collect at least 50% of his recoverable
damages or whether the article imposes solidary liability on joint tortfeasors
subject to a cap of 50%."" In reversing the third circuit, the Touchard court
accepted the second circuit's interpretation of Civil Code article 2324(B) and
found that the article limited the exposure of joint tortfeasors to 50% of the
recoverable damages. Therefore, non-conspiring, joint tortfeasors were solidarily
bound but only up to 50% of the recoverable damages. As long as the plaintiff's
fault is less than the defendant's, he may recover 50% of his recoverable
damages from any one of the liable defendants regardless of that defendant's
degree of fault.85 In footnote three of the opinion, the Touchard court applied
its interpretation of 2324(B) to the facts of the case:
Under this interpretation, Touchard would be able to recover an
additional $20,000.00 from either Allstate, assuming the policy limits
have not and would not be exceeded by this addition, or Martha Causey.
Thus, Touchard could recover $82,000.00 on herjudgment. Alternative-
ly, Touchard could collect an additional $38,000.00 ($43,000.00 less
$5,000.00 to prevent recovery from exceeding the $100,000.00
judgment) from Texas Farmer's Insurance Company, assuming the
policy limits have not and would not be exceeded by this addition, or
Steven Lege. Thus, Touchard could recover $100,000.00."
What the court described in footnote three has been characterized as the
"footnote 3 bump up one" (bump one) approach. 7 This approach applies in the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 887 n.I.
83. Touchard v. Williams, 606 So. 2d 927 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
84. Touchard, 617 So. 2d at 886.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 887 n.3.
87. Galligan, supra note 64, at 569.
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situation where one joint tortfeasor is unable to "pay" his virile share. The bump
one approach allows the plaintiff to increase the liability of one joint tortfeasor
to a maximum of 50% of the recoverable damages. If a joint tortfeasor's
liability is 50% or more, the plaintiff cannot bump him. The increase allows the
plaintiff to make up for shortages caused by another party's payment of less than
its full share. An increase in the defendant's liability is only limited by the
proviso that the defendant's fault must be greater than the plaintiff's. For
example, Fred is involved in an automobile accident with Barney, Wilma, and
Pebbles. The jury allocates fault to the parties as follows: Fred 0%, Barney
63%, Wilma 30%, and Pebbles 7%. Barney is insolvent. Fred may then "bump"
either Wilma or Pebbles from their share of liability to 50% to compensate for
Barney's insolvency." In footnote six, the Cavalier court took notice of
Touchard. Cavalier footnote six stated: "This court in Touchard v. Williams
interpreted the 1987 amendment to La.Civ.Code art. 2324B as placing a fifty
percent limitation on the solidary liability of each negligent joint tortfeasor."'
The court used the word "each" in describing the 50% limitation. Cavalier could
be read to allow a plaintiff to raise "each" defendant's degree of fault up to 50%.
In other words each joint tortfeasor may be bumped, bump two as opposed to
one. This interpretation, allowing a bump two, would change the current state
of the law, bump one, as it is understood by some. However, neither footnote
six nor the opinion in Cavalier explicitly overruled Touchard footnote three.
Thus, Cavalier might be an affirmation of Touchard's footnote three or a
reinterpretation of Touchard's text with regard to solidary liability. While the
exact effect is unclear, what is clear is the confusion that remains. This note will
discuss Cavalier's impact on Touchard's footnote three in more detail in Part V.
88. For example: Fred 0%h
Barney 63%, but insolvent
Wilma 30%
Pebbles 7%
Fred's alternatives: (a) Fred can bump Wilma and recover 57%. (Wilma's 30% + A Bump Factor
of 20% assigned to Wilma + Pebbles' 7%) or (b) Fred can bump up Pebbles and recover 80%
(Pebbles' 7% + A Bump Factor of 43% assigned to Pebbles + Wilma's 30%)
However if the facts were changed:
Fred 8%
Barney 60%, but insolvent
Wilma 25%
Pebbles 7%
Fred would be unable to bump Pebbles because his degree of fault, 8%, is greater than her degree
of fault, 7%. Fred's only option would be to bump up Wilma. He can still recover from Pebbles,
but only to her degree of fault. Therefore in this scenario Fred's maximum recovery is 57%. The
allocation would look like this: Wilma 50% (her 25% + A Bump Factor of 25%) + Pebbles' 7%.
89. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 982 n.6 (La. 1995) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
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V. ANALYSIS
The most significant questions raised by Cavalier are: (1) what are the policies
the court is trying to implement; (2) what does the court mean by negligence
imputed to the plaintiff or defendant; and, (3) what impact, if any, did Cavalier's
footnote three have on the limitation of solidarity expressed in Touchard?
A. Policies Espoused by Cavalier; Quantify Fault When Necessary and
Appropriate
Read strictly, Cavalier stands only for the proposition that a factfinder should
not quantify an employer's fault when the concurrent negligence of the employer
and a third party combine to cause harm to an employee. Cavalier's language
regarding the settling tortfeasor and footnote three's language concerning
quantification of negligence imputed to the plaintiff or defendant are merely dicta.
However, dicta from the Louisiana Supreme Court are persuasive in this unsettled
area of the law and suggest what policies the court is trying to implement through
its decisions. The court gives an indication of the underlying policies with its
consistent use of the terms "necessary" and "appropriate."
1. Necessity and Simplicity of Litigation
The court stated that the factfinder should not quantify an employer's fault
when the employer's negligence combines with the negligence of a third party
to cause harm to an employee because it is not necessary. It is not necessary,
the court explained, because the joint tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution from
the employer. The employer also enjoys the statutory immunity provided by
worker's compensation. The employer may only become a party to the suit by
intervening to recover the compensation payments already received by the
employee. Thus, the employer's percentage of fault is irrelevant, i.e., unneces-
sary. However, the employer's fault is relevant to the joint tortfeasor in Cavalier
because by quantifying the employer's fault the joint tortfeasor's liability is
initially decreased. However, the immune employer's fault does not simply
disappear.9' As the court of appeal noted, the employer's fault should have
been quantified and then distributed among the at-fault parties on a pro rata basis
under the Gauthier formula. Consequently, the joint tortfeasor, being the only
remaining party, would be liable for the whole. The joint tortfeasor in Cavalier
was going to bear 100% of the liability regardless of whether the employer's
fault was quantified. However, quantifying the employer's fault imposes the
additional steps of quantification and redistribution before arriving at the final
figure. Therefore, the factfinder should not quantify the employer's fault because
it would add additional, unnecessary steps to the equation. Simply stated, one
90. This is precisely what happened in Cavalier at the trial level.
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of the policies espoused by Cavalier is simplicity of litigation. This policy is
further reflected by Cavalier's language which allows the factfinder to quantify
the fault of the settling tortfeasor.
Quantifying the fault of the settling tortfeasor is necessary because, unlike
the employer, his fault is relevant, and his inclusion in the litigation does not
unnecessarily complicate the litigation. The settling tortfeasor's fault is relevant
because the plaintiff has taken an action which will impair the remaining party's
ordinary contribution rights. By quantifying the settling party's degree of fault,
the plaintiff does not benefit from double recovery. Without quantifying the
settling party's fault, the plaintiff could collect from both the settling party and
the remaining tortfeasors. The tort victim's recovery "must be reduced by the
proportionate share of the settling tortfeasor." '  Again, one of Cavalier's
underlying policies is simplicity of litigation.
2. Appropriate Recovery Through Accurate Apportionment
Why is it inappropriate to quantify the employer's fault? As noted above,
the Cavalier court felt the negative impact of quantifying an employer's fault
was too great a burden on the plaintiff. First, it reduces the total amount of
recoverable fault by including the immune employer in the allocation of fault.
Second, the employer can recover any compensation payments made to the
employee from the amount the employee recovers from the third party.9" When
the factfinder quantifies the employer's fault, the employee's "pool" of money
from which he can draw is reduced. Additionally, the worker's compensation
scheme allows the employer to recover any compensation payments made to the
employee from any amount the employee recovers from the other parties. The
employer recovers its compensation payments from the employee's reduced
recovery pool first, leaving any remaining balance for the plaintiff. Therefore,
quantifying the employer's fault doubly reduces the employee's recovery. The
Cavalier court clearly illustrates this point.93 Justice Dennis, concurring, also
endorsed a policy in favor of the plaintiff's rights:
Article 2324 as a whole should be strictly construed against the
derogation of the established rights of tort victims against tort-
feasors.... Article 2324 should not be interpreted to injure tort
victims' rights by compelling the quantification of the "fault" of the
victims' fully immune employers. Instead, . . . (2324(B)] should be
read less injuriously so as, at most, to refer to persons who do not enjoy
full immunity by virtue of the quid pro quo between employers and
employees-for example, persons who enjoy partial or situational
91. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 981.
92. See supra notes 17, 18, and 38.
93. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 982.
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immunities, such as family members, governmental entities, and rural
landowners."
However, Justice Dennis' comments in favor of the plaintiff go too far. The
immune employer does benefit from situational immunity just like a family
member, governmental entity, or rural landowner. The employer's immunity is
not absolute, the employer is situationally immune from suit only when its
negligence causes injury; it is not immune from suit for intentional torts. But,
Cavalier is about more than the plaintiff's rights, it is also about the need for
appropriate recovery by joint tortfeasors, i.e., rights of contribution. Allowing
the factfinder to quantify the settling tortfeasor's and the third party defendant's
fault also demonstrates this underlying policy of Cavalier.
Quantifying the settling tortfeasor's fault is appropriate because it will not
penalize the plaintiff. The plaintiff has settled with the released party of his own
accord and, by his own actions, has reduced the "pool" from which he will
ultimately recover. Allowing the factfider to quantify the fault of the third
party defendant is also appropriate. The third party's fault represents what he
must pay in the way of indemnification to the primary defendant who will pay
all of the primary judgment. In this way, the third party defendant indirectly
contributes to the plaintiff's recovery. Thus, Cavalier's second underlying policy
is ensuring appropriate recovery through accurate apportionment of fault.
However, Cavalier's policies can be turned around and used to demand the
apportionment of an employer's degree of fault. If Cavalier's goal is to achieve
an appropriate recovery through accurate apportionment of fault, then an
employer's fault should also be determined. However, this argument fails to
consider the statutory "bargain" between the employer and the employee,
workers' compensation. The employer has paid compensation premiums with
the knowledge that it will not be held accountable in a negligence action. The
employer has also paid compensation benefits to the employee and will only
recover those benefits if the employee recovers in tort from a third party
tortfeasor.
The policies espoused by the Cavalier court favor simplicity and appropriate
recovery. The factfinder should quantify the fault of non-parties only when it is
necessary, that is, when their degrees of fault are relevant to either the plaintiffs
recovery or to the contribution rights among the tortfeasors. Second, Cavalier's
policies indicate the factfinder should quantify a party's degree of fault when it
will aid in the plaintiff's recovery or in the contribution claims among the joint
tortfeasors. If, as in the case of the employer, quantification of fault will reduce
the plaintiff's recovery without any other effect, then quantification in that case
is inappropriate. In footnote three, the court also indorsed quantification of a
non-party's imputable negligence, but did not specifically address the quantifica-
94. Id. at 985.
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tion of a phantom's 9s fault. However, the court's language in footnote three
may be instructive on how to handle the phantom's degree of fault.
B. Quantification of Negligence Imputed to the Plaintiff or Defendant
In footnote three, the Cavalier court stated, without further explanation, that
the factfinder should quantify a non-party's fault if the non-party's fault is
imputable to the plaintiff or to a defendant. The court stated: "Another obvious
situation in which quantification of the fault of a non-party is appropriate, as well
as necessary, is when a non-party is a person whose negligence is imputable to
the plaintiff or to a defendant." What is meant by negligence imputed to the
plaintiff or to a defendant? Black's Law Dictionary gives the following
definition of imputed negligence:
The negligence of one person may be chargeable to another
depending upon the relationship of the parties, as for example, the
negligence of an agent acting within the scope of his employment is
chargeable to the principal. Negligence which is not directly attribut-
able to the person himself, but which is the negligence of a person who
is in privity with him, and with whose fault he is chargeable."
In Louisiana this relationship is also known as vicarious liability. Vicarious
liability is a narrow concept. Parents are vicariously liable for their minor
children and employers are vicariously liable for the torts of their servant agents
under their control and in the course and scope of their employment." Imputed
negligence in the context of vicarious liability would create a small class of
persons for whom the plaintiff or defendant would be responsible. Fault can also
be imputed by means of the negligence concept of duty/risk." Duty/risk is a
concept which holds a person responsible for the acts of another because the
actor's conduct fell within the scope of the risk of the liable party's conduct. In
other words, the liable party's action or inaction included the risk that the actor
would cause harm. Imputed negligence in the duty/risk context would create a
broad class of persons for whom the plaintiff or defendant would be responsible.
Liability would extend to all situations when the acting party's activity fell within
the scope of the risk of the plaintiff or defendant's actions or inactions.
Cavalier's underlying policies, simplicity and accurate recovery, should dictate
95. A "phantom" is someone who, for some reason, is unknown. For example, the unidentified
driver who forces another off of the road and fails to stop.
96. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 981 n.3.
97. Black's Law Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990).
98. La. Civ. Code arts. 2317-2320. See also La. Civ. Code art. 2319 for the liability of curators
for the acts of interdicts.
99. See Dixie Drive It Yourself System of New Orleans v. American Beverage Co., 242 La.
471, 137 So. 2d 298 (1962); Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
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whether imputed fault should be extended to responsible parties in the. narrow
(vicarious liability) or broad sense (duty/risk).
Applying imputed negligence in the vicarious liability context would result
in simple litigation and would also comport with Cavalier's policies. The only
party whose negligence would be imputed to the plaintiff or to a defendant
would be an imputee's minor child or servant agent. A judge's inquiry into the
nature of liability would be simple and factually oriented, with few unrelated
policy decisions factoring into the determination of fault. Do the facts suggest
this individual is a child for whom the plaintiff or defendant is responsible? Do
the facts suggest the non-party is an employee for whom the plaintiff or
defendant is responsible? Applying imputed negligence in the duty/risk context,
however, would not be as simple and could possibly result in a great number of
persons whose fault could be imputed to the plaintiff or to a defendant. In the
duty/risk context all of the plaintiff or defendant's activities, depending on the
scope of the risk of the activities, could possibly generate persons for whom
negligence could be imputed. The judge's inquiry would be factually driven and
complicated by policy issues. Did this defendant have a duty to protect this
person, from this harm, under these circumstances? Did this victim fall within
the scope of the risk of this activity under these circumstances?
Despite the need for greater inquiry into the nature of the act and the larger
number of persons for whom negligence would be imputed. to the plaintiff or
defendant, the duty/risk notion of imputed fault best comports with the policies
underlying Cavalier. While the vicarious liability idea of imputed negligence is
simple, it fails to address the danger of misallocating a non-party's fault. For
example, if a non-party is neither a minor child nor a servant agent, under
vicarious liability, that non-party's fault would not be quantified. The parties to
the litigation could each bear the non-party's fault regardless of their relationship
to him. But, if the duty/risk notion of imputed fault is applied, the parties will
bear fault according to their relationship with the non-party. If one of the
litigating party's actions included the risk the non-party would cause harm, then
that party alone should bear the non-party's degree of fault. For example, Fred
is the victim of Wilma, Pebbles, and Barney's concurrent fault. Pebbles is a
non-party, phantom, or otherwise absent party, whose fault falls within the
duty/risk of Wilma's activity. The percentages of fault, according to who
actually did what to whom are:
Fred 5%
Wilma 55%
Pebbles 10%
Barney 30%.
Wilma's percentage of actual fault is 65% because it includes both her degree
of fault and Pebbles' fault, the person for whom she is also responsible. But, if
the jury fails to consider Pebbles' fault, it may improperly assign her fault to one
or both of the non-responsible parties, Fred or Barney. By quantifying Pebbles'
fault, the jury (1) apportions fault according to who, both party and non-party,
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did what and (2) then assigns percentages of fault to the responsible parties.'"
While the duty/risk notion of imputed fault falls in line with Cavalier's policies,
it is also consistent with one of the court's most recent decisions in this area of
the law, Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd.'O'
On October 3, 1988, an unknown assailant, who entered through a second
story bedroom window, raped Christi Veazey in her apartment at the Elmwood
Park Plantation complex. Veazey filed suit against Southmark Management, the
company entrusted with the management of Elmwood Park. Veazey claimed
Southmark was negligent in providing inadequate security and negligent in its
representations regarding both the amount of security and the number of past
criminal acts at the complex.'02 The jury found Veazey free from fault and
awarded her $150,000.00 in general damages and $30,000.00 in special damages,
for a total damage award of $180,000.00. However, in a manner inconsistent
with the verdict, the jury allocated only 60% of the fault to Southmark and 40%
to Veazey. The trial judge granted a plaintiff's motion for clarification and
judgment not withstanding the verdict, and reallocated all of the fault to
Southmark. "A divided [supreme court] held that because the 'specific' risk
which made the complex operator's conduct negligent was the criminal attack by
the rapist, the complex operator was liable for the full amount." 3 In essence,
the rapist's degree of fault was imputed to the defendant, Southmark, because the
rapist's conduct fell within the scope of the risk, duty/risk, of the defendant's
negligence. Thus, while Veazey deals with the imputation of an intentional
actor's fault, similarly, Cavalier deals with the imputation of a negligent actor's
fault.
In order to be consistent with Veazey, the phrase negligence "imputable to
the plaintiff or to a defendant" must mean imputable within the duty/risk context.
The rapist's intentional tort in Veazey was not imputable to the defendant
because of vicarious liability: it was imputable because the rapist's actions fell
within the risk created by the defendant's negligence. Therefore, it would be
inconsistent to impute fault under duty/risk for intentional torts but to impute
fault under vicarious liability for negligence actions. Cavalier represents a
logical progression from Veazey. Therefore, if a phantom's negligence or
intentional tort falls within the duty/risk of the plaintiff's or a defendant's
activity, under Cavalier or Veazey, the phantom's negligence or intentional tort
should be imputed to the responsible party.
100. See Martin v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. and Dev., 665 So. 2d 457 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 666 So. 2d 657 (1995), which states that fault should be apportioned to a phantom tortfeasor,
but cites pre.Cavalier jurisprudence. Ferrell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 650 So. 2d 742 (La. 1995).
But see Duplantis v. Danos, 664 So. 2d 1383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995), which holds that it is error
to allocate fault to a phantom under Cavalier. Duplantis does not explore the meaning of imputed
negligence.
101. 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994).
102. Id. at 713.
103. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 11, at 226.
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One factual difficulty remains if a parallel is to be drawn between Cavalier
and Veazey, between imputed negligence and imputed intentional torts. In
Veazey, the rapist's activity was the "specific" risk within the defendant's
duty.'0  "Identifying the 'specific' risk within ... [each] defendant's duty may
be a rather nebulous quest . . . .'"' As a result, "'scope of the risk' can be a
'slippery slope' to responsibility, i.e., liability, for the unforeseeable and to what
some might deem the unreasonable."'" However, the duty/risk class is not
without its boundaries. Duty/risk is a question for the court to decide as a matter
of law. The court in Cavalier alludes to this fact.
The Cavalier court pointed out that "since the Legislature did not specify
which non-parties should have their fault quantified by the jury, the appropriate.
ness, and indeed the necessity, of quantifying the fault of a particular non-party
... is inherently a question to be decided by the courts.""0 7 That is, a judge
will act as a gatekeeper: he will determine if the non-party's actions fall within
the duty/risk of one of the parties. If the answer is yes, the factfinder will be
allowed to quantify that non-party's fault which then will be reallocated to the
appropriate party. In so doing, the correct party will bear the non-party's degree
of fault. Finally, in applying the duty/risk notion of imputed fault, no relevant
class of non-parties is left out of the inquiry because the duty/risk notion of
imputed fault includes the narrower vicarious liability class.
C. Cavalier's Possible Effect on the Limits of Solidarity
Another question left unanswered by Cavalier is, what impact, if any, does
Cavalier's footnote three have on the limitation of solidary expressed in
Touchard? As noted in Part IV.C of this casenote, Cavalier's footnote six may
have reversed Touchard's footnote three regarding the nature of limited solidarity
among non-conspiring tortfeasors. Touchard's footnote three stated that a
plaintiff could only seek 50% of his recoverable damages from one joint
tortfeasor, that is, only one joint tortfeasor could have his percentage of liability
raised to 50%, the bump one approach.
The Touchard court made it clear that modified solidary liability is not
conditioned on a plaintiff's actual recovery. "[Clonditional or functional
solidarity, and its ramifications, among joint tortfeasors, has never been a part
of Louisiana law."'0 8 "[Conditional or functional liability] might frequently
prompt post judgment reassignment of quantum exposure because of the
conditional nature of the judgment. Thus a 'final' judgment would not become
'final' under this interpretation."'" Therefore, it is incorrect to assert that joint
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 980-81 (La. 1995).
108. Touchard v. Williams, 617 So. 2d 885, 892 (La. 1993).
109. Id. at 893.
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tortfeasors are solidarily liable only to the extent necessary to recover 50% of the
damage award." 0  Solidary liability is not contingent upon recovery. A
defendant is either solidarily liable or not.
1. What is the Nature of Touchard 's Limited Solidarity?
Touchard's text is ambiguous. In adopting the Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeal's reasoning,"' the Touchard court stated "that the phrase [only to the
extent necessary for the person suffering the injury, death, or loss to recover fifty
per cent of his recoverable damages] was intended to limit the exposure ofJoint
tortfeasors to 50%, rather than 100%, of the plaintiff's recoverable damages." ! 2
This may mean that each joint tortfeasor is solidarily liable for 50%. Consequently,
each would be responsible for up to 50% and each could have its degree of liability
elevated from its percentage of fault up to 50% (bump two). However, the court
continued, stating "[t]hus, a victoriousplaintiffcould secure 50% ofhis recoverable
damages from any one of the liable defendants.""' Therefore, a plaintiff may
recover 50% of his damages from any one of the liable defendants. But, does this
mean he may recover from only one or both of the joint tortfeasors: may the
plaintiffbump one or bump two? However, the third sentence, quoted above, when
read in pari materia with footnote three, appears to suggest that the plaintiff will
bump only one tortfeasor. The judgment debtor, in turn, who pays more than his
share, can seek contribution or indemnity from his joint tortfeasors." 4 The
Touchard court did not apply its reading of Article 2324(B), but remanded the case
to the district court.'
2. How has Touchard Been Received by the Lower Courts?
The lower courts have only applied Touchard's handling of the 50% liability
issue once. In Hayes v. Kelly,"' the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
interpreted Touchard as requiring a bump up of two joint tortfeasors. The Kelly
court explained: "The Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 2324(B)
of the Louisiana Civil Code requires that each defendant, the City of Alexandria
and the SheriffofRapides Parish, be held jointly liable for 50% of [the] recoverable
damages. Consequently, the City and the Sheriff are each liable to Hayes for
$27,500.00."' '
110. Id.
111. See Johnson v. Fontana, 610 So. 2d 1119 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), writ denied, 618 So. 2d
407 (1993); Thompson v. Hodge, 577 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
112. Touchard, 617 So. 2d at 887 (emphasis added).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 893.
116. 625 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 633 So. 2d 171 (1994).
117. Id. at 633-34.
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3. Ambiguity, Article 2324(B), and Solidary Liability
"When the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must
be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the
law." '  Before the modification of solidary liability for non-conspiring
tortfeasors, one joint tortfeasor could be held accountable for 100% of the
damages. There are two ways to view article 2324(B)'s modification of this
liability. First, a plaintiff could recover 100% of his damages, but Article
2324(B) would reduce each tortfeasor's exposure from 100% to 50% (bump
two). Second, before the amendment to Article 2324(B), a plaintiff could hold
one defendant liable for 100% of the damages. Therefore, Article 2324(B)
would limit the 50% liability exposure to one tortfeasor (bump one). The
policies that underlie solidarity determine which interpretation is correct.
Solidary liability ensures that (1) the plaintiff will recover, and (2) he will
not have to bear the burden of an insolvent tortfeasor."9 Civil Code article
2324(B) strikes a fine balance if it allows the plaintiff to bump up two
tortfeasors. The plaintiff is still ensured 100% recovery, but the burden of
insolvency is spread between two tortfeasors. Bumping only one tortfeasor
would shift the burden of insolvency from the tortfeasors to the plaintiff. This
clearly fails to conform to the purpose of the law.
4. Cavalier's Language and the Weight of a Footnote
Cavalier's footnote six clearly interprets "the 1987 amendment to
La.Civ.Code art. 2324B as placing a fifty percent limitation on the solidary
liability of each negligent joint tortfeasor, as opposed to the previously existing
one hundred percent.'"" Cavalier's use of the word "each" suggests that both
negligent tortfeasors are solidarily liable for 50% of the damages. This is the
only reference in the majority opinion to Touchard. Is it possible the justices
meant to overrule Touchard footnote three with another footnote which contains
such ambiguous language? Does Cavalier mention Touchard's footnote at all?
No, Cavalier does not refer to Touchard's footnote three; Cavalier cites the
Touchard opinion. Arguably, Cavalier's footnote six is a reinterpretation of the
meaning of the Touchard opinion. A reading of Cavalier's footnote six that
allows the plaintiff to bump two best comports with the policies that underlie the
modification of solidary liability, protecting the plaintiff and balancing the risks
of insolvency.
118. LU. Civ. Code art. 10.
119. Touchard, 617 So. 2d at 890.
120. Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 982 n.6 (La. 1995) (emphasis
added).
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D. Practical Consequences
Cavalier provides weapons for both the plaintiff and defendant. A plaintiff
can now argue a non-party's negligence, for example the negligence of an absent
party or phantom, is imputable to the defendant. That non-party's fault would
then be quantified and assigned to the defendant, increasing the plaintiff's
recovery. Likewise, the defendant can turn this argument around and argue that
the non-party's fault should be imputed to the plaintiff. Of course, defense
counsel can also attempt to lay all of the blame on a party whose fault will not
be quantified. Alternatively, the defendant could argue that his duty did not
extend to this risk or that all of the fault should be borne by the plaintiff. For
example, the defendant in Cavalier could have argued that all of the fault should
have been borne by the immune employer or the plaintiff. By "shifting the
blame," there is a possibility that the plaintiff will not recover at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the Old Testament, King Solomon was forced to decide which of two
women was the mother of a child. Not knowing which woman was the actual
mother, the king demanded his sword. Solomon told the women he was going
to cut the child in half and give half to each of them. One woman agreed, the
other protested stating it would be better for the child to go with the first rather
than be killed. King Solomon determined the real mother of the child was the
woman who protested.'2 ' The Cavalier decision represents a judicial struggle
of Solomon-like proportions. The Louisiana Supreme Court began its struggle
in 1991 with a 4-3 vote in the Guidry decision. This decision was reversed in
1993 with a 6-1 vote in Gauthier. In Cavalier, the court unanimously returned
to Guidry. However, the legislature, through House Bill 21, legislatively
overruled Cavalier and amended and reenacted Civil Code articles 2323 and
2324. Throughout this series of cases and legislative changes, the judicial,
legislative and executive branches have been faced with a number of competing
issues and policies. All three branches of state government have had to
recognize the employer's rights under worker's compensation and the employee's
right to adequate compensation within the framework of comparative fault and
solidary liability. Because Cavalier and revised Civil Code articles 2323 and
2324 involve so many competing issues, who is to say when or if these Civil
Code articles will be amended again, marking a possible return to the principles
espoused in the Cavalier decision. The Cavalier court, with four years of post-
Guidry and two years of post-Gauthier experience, spoke with one voice: "We
now hold that quantification of employer fault is unnecessary and inappropri-
ate."'" However, in a classic exercise of democratic principles, the legislature
121. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
122. Cavalier, 657 So. 2d at 978.
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responded to Cavalier by amending two articles of the Civil Code, casting the
Cavalier decision into the realm of prior jurisprudence and historical footnote.
A. Edward Hardin, Jr.
